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INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment proscribes Congress from enacting laws
that restrict the content of speech.1 Despite the unequivocal language
of the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has
consistently held that it does not protect obscenity.2 The Court has
offered two primary reasons for not protecting obscenity: 1) obscenity
contributes nothing to society; and 2) obscenity was simply never
intended to be protected.3
In contrast to obscene speech, violent speech gets full First
Amendment protection.4 While the Court states that obscenity
categorically contributes nothing to society, it reasons that even the
*

J.D. Candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., 2001, University of Minnesota. Michael dedicates this Note to his
nieces and nephews: Madison, Tyler, Gabriel, Brenner, Eva, and his next nephew
due in June 2007.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 2.
2
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973).
3
See Roth, 354 U.S. at 483-84.
4
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 449 (1969).
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most despicable, hateful, violent speech benefits society in some way,
and is thus deserving of constitutional protection.5
In 2005, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois ruled that two Illinois statutes aimed at restricting the sale of
violent and sexually explicit video games to minors violated the First
Amendment.6 The court determined that both the Illinois Violent
Video Games Law (“VVGL”) and Illinois Sexually Explicit Video
Games Law (“SEVGL”) were content-based restrictions that could be
justified only by compelling interests and narrowly tailored plans.7
The State appealed the SEVGL ruling only, and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that
the SEVGL required and did not pass strict scrutiny.8
While both statutes failed strict scrutiny at trial, the VVGL and
SEVGL failed for different reasons. The district court determined the
VVGL did not encompass a compelling interest,9 whereas the SEVGL
did encompass a compelling interest, but was not narrowly tailored.10
The court recognized the importance of protecting minors from violent
content, but held that it did not provide a constitutional basis to
regulate speech.11
While the VVGL got hung up in compelling interest analysis, the
trial court simply assumed protecting children from sexual-themed
content is compelling, and moved on to narrow tailoring analysis.12
The Seventh Circuit applied the same cursory compelling interest
analysis to the SEVGL.13
5

See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich (ESA I), 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051,1055
(N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006).
7
Id. at 1072, 1078.
8
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich (ESA II), 469 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir.
2006).
9
ESA I, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1073-76.
10
Id. at 1080.
11
Id. at 1073-76.
12
Id. at 1080.
13
ESA II, 469 F.3d at 646.
6
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This Note will contend that while both the trial court and Seventh
Circuit’s ruling were consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the
disparate levels of protection afforded violent and sexually explicit
speech are legally and logically inconsistent. This inconsistency
presents different problems for adults and minors, and requires
different remedies. For adults, obscenity should be afforded the same
constitutional protection as violent content. And in the realm of
minors, the notion of protecting children from harmful content should
apply with as much rigor to violent content as it does to sexually
explicit content.
Section I will detail the relevant history of First Amendment
protection of violent and sexually explicit materials. Section II will
examine the district court and Seventh Circuit applications of the
relevant First Amendment and obscenity tests in ESA I & ESA II,
respectively. Section III will explore how the Seventh Circuit and
Supreme Court should alter obscenity law for adults and content
restrictions for minors.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS VIOLENT SPEECH BUT DOES NOT
PROTECT OBSCENITY
A. Content-based Restrictions
With limited exceptions, the First Amendment prevents the
government from enacting laws that restrict expression because of its
content.14 As a result, any restriction on the content of speech or
expression is presumptively invalid.15
Our political system and culture depend on the principle that
citizens, rather than government, decide what messages are worth
stating or receiving.16 Instead, citizens bear this responsibility
individually, and any attempt by the government to restrict expression

14

E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
Id.
16
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
15
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poses the risk that it is attempting to stifle unpopular ideas.17 Thus,
courts apply the most stringent tool of analysis, strict scrutiny, to any
content-based restriction.18 Strict scrutiny demands that content-based
restrictions “must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling
government interest.”19
There are, however, several limited exceptions to the First
Amendment’s ban on content-based restrictions.20 Namely, the First
Amendment does not protect child pornography21 or libel.22
And although obscenity was long assumed unprotected, it wasn’t
until 1957 when the Supreme Court expressly ruled in Roth v. United
States that the Constitution affords obscene content no protection.23 In
Roth, the Court first explained that the “unconditional phrasing of the
First Amendment” is not actually unconditional.24 It also explained
that the purpose of the First Amendment is “to assure [the] unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.”25
Thus, the First Amendment protects all speech of social
importance, regardless of its nature or content, because it furthers the
constitutional purpose of promoting social and political discourse.26
But the Court determined that any value obscenity might provide “is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”27 And
because obscenity is not protected, the Court decided it didn’t need to

17

Id.
See id. at 642.
19
U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
20
E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992).
21
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002).
22
Beauharnais v. People of State of Ill., 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
23
354 U.S. 476, 481, 485 (1957).
24
Id. at 483.
25
Id. at 484.
26
Id.
27
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).
18
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consider exactly how obscenity diminishes order or morality.28 This
form of circular reasoning pervades obscenity law and is
representative of the underlying problem with obscenity law.29
Although the Court was certain that obscenity is per se excluded
from First Amendment protection, it was not as certain of just how to
define obscenity.30 It ultimately held that obscenity is not synonymous
with sex, but rather “deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest.”31 This, of course, begs the question of what exactly
“prurient” means. The Court cited several sources to define prurient
and pruriency.32 These definitions include:
•
•
•
•

“material having a tendency to excite lustful
thoughts;”33
“uneasy with desire or longing;”34
“lascivious desire or thought;”35
“[a] thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its
predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a
shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor in description or
representation of such matters.”36

28

See Roth, 354 U.S. at 486-87.
See, e.g., id. at 486-87 (arguing that it is irrelevant whether obscenity
actually causes harm because it is not protected).
30
Id. at 487-88.
31
Id. at 487.
32
Id. at 488 n.20.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 488 n.20 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(Unabridged, 2d ed. 1949)).
35
Roth, 354 U.S. at 488 n.20 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (Unabridged, 2d ed. 1949)).
36
Roth, 354 U.S. at 488 n.20 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2)
(Tentative Draft No. 6 1957)).
29
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The Court concluded its analysis of obscenity generally by stating
that government intrusion on freedom of speech must only occur when
necessary to protect more important interests.37 Obscenity, the Court
decided, encroached on more important interests.38 While it does not
explicitly state what those interests were, the opinion suggested the
interests were “social order and morality.”39 But how obscenity
diminishes social order and morality went unexplored by the Court.
We’re essentially left to take the Court’s word for it.
Interestingly, the Court conceded that states may regulate
obscenity merely for the “lustful thoughts” it provokes, and not
because it causes lawlessness, harm, or even “antisocial conduct.”40
This stands in stark contrast to the Court’s stance on violent speech,
which cannot be regulated merely for thoughts provoked or
advocated.41
B. Evolution of Obscenity Law
1. Ginsberg v. New York
In 1968, the Court decided the seminal case Ginsberg v. New
York.42 Today, Ginsberg stands for the proposition that states may
regulate sexual materials intended for minors that they would not be
able to regulate for adults.43
In Ginsberg, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York
statute regulating sales of sexually explicit magazines to minors.44 The
37

Roth, 354 U.S. at 488.
See id.
39
Id. at 485.
40
Id. at 486.
41
C.f., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (statutes regulating
“mere advocacy” of violence “fall[] within the condemnation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments”).
42
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
43
See id. at 637.
44
Id. at 631, 633.
38
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New York statute adapted the three-part test for determining obscenity
from A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure” v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
in order to define obscenity “on the basis of its appeal to minors.”45
By upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the Court also
upheld the concept of “variable obscenity.”46 Variable obscenity is the
notion that content that is merely indecent when intended for adults
may be obscene when intended for children.47
Notably, the Court premised its decision on the basis of potential
harm sexually explicit materials may cause to minors.48 This
represents a departure from Roth, which allowed obscenity restrictions
solely for the “lustful thoughts” provoked.49 In Ginsberg, the Court
held that states may regulate sales of sexually explicit materials to
minors by finding a rational basis for the conclusion that the material
is harmful to minors.50 While this does not require scientific certainty
of harm,51 by premising the decision on potential harm rather than
mere thoughts incited, Ginsberg required more of legislatures than
Roth.
2. Miller v. California: The modern test for obscenity.
While the Court held in Roth that obscenity is not protected
speech,52 it did not set a clear test for determining what constitutes

45

Id. at 635.
Id. at 636.
47
Id. (“[T]he concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter may vary
according to the group to whom the questionable material is directed or from whom
it is quarantined.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v.
Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 75 (1966))).
48
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640-41.
49
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486 (1957).
50
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641.
51
Id. at 642-43.
52
Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
46
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obscenity until 1973 when it decided Miller v. California.53 In Miller,
the Court articulated a three-part test for juries to apply to determine
whether content is obscene:54
(a) whether
‘the
average
person,
applying
contemporary community standards’ would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, or scientific value.55
This test, while very similar to the Memoirs formulation and the
Ginsberg test, differs in one principal way.56 The final prong of the
Miller test requires triers of fact consider “whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, or scientific value,” while the
Memoirs test used the term “utterly without redeeming social
importance.”57
Miller’s primary legacy is its test for obscenity, but the Court also
took great pains in the opinion to affirm Roth.58 It stated that
categorizing obscenity as a part of the “free and robust exchange of
ideas and political debate” demeans the First Amendment and all that
it represents.59 It further stated that First Amendment protection was
designed to allow the exchange of ideas to stimulate political and
53

See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 574 (2002) (“Ending over a decade of
turmoil, this Court in Miller set forth the governing three-part test for assessing
whether material is obscene and thus unprotected by the First Amendment”); see
also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
54
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
55
Id.
56
See ESA II, 469 F.3d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 2006).
57
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25.
58
See id. at 34-35.
59
Id. at 34.
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social change.60 But rather than recognize the potential role obscenity
could play in bringing about change in society’s attitudes toward sex,
the Court decided that obscenity cannot contribute to this exchange or
stimulate social change.61
Furthermore, Miller also represents a step backward from
Ginsberg because the Court spoke in Ginsberg to the harms sexually
explicit materials may cause minors as a basis for regulation, but the
Court abandoned this line of reasoning in Miller. Rather, the Court
reverted back to the Roth line of reasoning that obscenity may be
regulated simply because it is offensive.62
C. Violent speech receives full First Amendment protection.
In contrast to obscene speech, the Supreme Court has held that the
Constitution affords the full protection of the First Amendment to
violent expression.63 This means that states may only regulate violent
speech where it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action” and “is likely to incite or produce such action.”64 This test
immunizes advocacy of violence from government control.65 For
government regulation to succeed, the expression must do more than
merely “increase[] the chance an unlawful act will be committed at
some indefinite time in the future.”66 In this way, the test distinguishes
between mere advocacy of violence and words designed to incite
imminent lawless action.67
This test, of course, differs significantly from the Miller test for
obscenity, which only requires a showing that content appeals to
60

Id. at 34-35 (citing Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
See Miller, 413 U.S. at 35.
62
See id.
63
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
64
Id.
65
Id. at 448.
66
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
67
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448-49.
61
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prurient interests.68 Obscenity need not actually have any causal
relationship with harm,69 but violence, on the other hand, must be
shown that it is both designed to cause and likely to cause imminent
harm.70
II. APPLICATION OF THE BRANDENBURG TEST FOR VIOLENT SPEECH AND
THE GINSBERG/MILLER TEST FOR OBSCENITY IN ESA I & II
A. ESA I
The Seventh Circuit recently had the rare opportunity to apply
both the Brandenburg test for violent content and the Ginsberg/Miller
paradigm for sexually explicit content when it affirmed a case from
the Northern District of Illinois.71
ESA I involved a challenge to two statutes restricting the sale of
certain video games to minors.72 Groups representing developers,
distributors, and retailers of video games challenged the
constitutionality of the Illinois Violent Video Game Law (“VVGL”)
and the Sexually Explicit Video Game Law (“SEVGL”).73
1. VVGL did not include any compelling interests.
All parties in ESA I agreed the VVGL was a content-based
restriction subject to strict scrutiny analysis.74 But the state claimed it
had five compelling interests in regulating violent video games for
minors:

68

See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 642 (1968).
70
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
71
ESA I, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005) aff’d, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir.
2006).
72
Id. at 1055-56.
73
Id. at 1055.
74
Id. at 1072.
69
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1) preventing violent, aggressive, and asocial
behavior;
2) preventing psychological harm to minors who play
such games;
3) eliminating societal factors that may inhibit the
physiological and neurological development of its
youth;
4) facilitating the maturation of Illinois’ children into
law-abiding, productive adults; and,
5) assisting parents in protecting their children from
such games.75
While the district court agreed that these interests were important,
it countered that the statute could only regulate violent speech when
the State demonstrates that the anticipated “harms are real, not merely
conjectural.”76 Thus, the State had to prove that the video games it
sought to regulate actually caused the listed harms.77
Under Brandenburg, states must do more than assert that violent
video games increase the likelihood that children will commit acts of
violence at some undetermined time.78 Rather, the State may only
restrict the sale of violent video games to minors if the games are
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action, and [are]
likely to incite or produce such action.”79
The district court held the VVGL failed the Brandenburg test
because the State offered no evidence that the purpose of violent video
games is to incite violence, and because the expert testimony and
evidence offered at trial did not provide a causal link between playing

75

Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)).
77
ESA I, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1072.
78
Id. at 1073.
79
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
76
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the games and minors committing acts of violence.80 For these
reasons, the district court found the VVGL did not promote a
compelling government interest.81
Additionally, the interests of preventing developmental harm to
minors and assisting parents in shielding children from inappropriate
material also failed as compelling interests.82 Specifically, the interest
of preventing developmental harm failed because controlling access to
“allegedly dangerous” speech is the responsibility of parents, not the
State.83 Further, the interest of assisting parents in this responsibility is
under-inclusive as applied in the VVGL because it did not assist
parents with other media, such as TV and movies.84
The court also dismissed the State’s argument that Ginsberg
should apply in this matter, which would allow it to regulate content
that is inappropriate for minors.85 The court rejected the State’s
argument because it failed to account for the fact that the statute at
issue in Ginsberg did not regulate protected speech—it regulated
obscenity, which is unprotected.86
In addition to failing the compelling interest prong of strict
scrutiny, the district court also determined that even if the statute had
encompassed a compelling interest, it would have failed strict scrutiny
on narrow tailoring grounds.87 The court agreed that the statute did not
intrude on the rights of adults, but the court still concluded that the
plan was not narrowly tailored because the statute’s definition of
violence would likely lead video game developers to diminish the
amount of violence in the games to avoid regulation.88 This, in turn,

80

ESA I, 404 F. Supp 2d at 1073-74.
Id.
82
Id. at 1074-75.
83
Id. at 1075 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84
Id.
85
Id. at 1075-76.
86
Id. at 1076.
87
Id.
88
Id.
81
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would affect the rights of adults by reducing the number of violent
titles available to them.89
The court also found that the VVGL’s definition of violent video
games was unconstitutionally vague.90 The statute defined violent
video games as those “including depictions of or simulations of
human-on-human violence in which the player kills or otherwise
causes serious physical harm to another human.”91 While the court
would have normally found this definition sufficiently clear, it found it
unclear in the “fanciful” context of video games because of the blurry
line in the video game world among humans, zombies, and mutants.92
This was not the first time a federal court in the Seventh Circuit
examined a statute regulating violent video games for minors.93 As the
district court noted, ESA I was governed by American Amusement
Machine Ass’n v. Kendrick (“AAMA”).94 In AAMA, the Seventh Circuit
analyzed the constitutionality of an ordinance that limited minors’
access to violent video game machines located in public places.95
2. SEVGL did not include a narrowly tailored plan.
Just as it did with the VVGL, the district court held the SEVGL
was unconstitutional because it did not satisfy strict scrutiny.96 But
unlike with the VVGL, the court struck down the statute on narrow
tailoring grounds, not because it lacked a compelling interest.97

89

Id.
Id. at 1077.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
See id. at 1072 (citing Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick
(“AAMA”), 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001)).
94
ESA I, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1072.
95
AAMA, 244 F.3d 572.
96
ESA I, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1081.
97
See id.
90
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In applying strict scrutiny, the court assumed the statute satisfied
the compelling interest requirement without offering any analysis.98
But it found the statute failed on narrow tailoring grounds.99 The court
premised this conclusion on the statute’s failure to include certain
elements of Ginsberg/Miller test for obscenity.100 Namely, the statute
failed to include the “as a whole” language of the second prong of the
Ginsberg/Miller test and excluded the third prong entirely.101 By
omitting the last prong of the Ginsberg/Miller test, the statute would
necessarily regulate “large amounts of nonpornographic material with
serious education or other value.”102 Without the final prong, the
statute would regulate games based “on one scene without regard to
the value of the game as a whole.”103 Such a broad statute cannot be
justified even by the compelling interest of protecting harm to
minors.104
B. ESA II: The Seventh Circuit affirms the district court’s ruling.
In ESA I, the district court struck down both the VVGL and
SEVGL on First Amendment grounds.105 The State of Illinois then
appealed the district court’s decision regarding the SEVGL only.106
Judge Williams, writing for the Seventh Circuit and joined by Judge
Bauer and Judge Rovner, affirmed the district court’s ruling primarily
because she found the SEVGL insufficiently narrowly tailored.107

98

Id at 1079.
Id. at 1080.
100
Id. at 1080.
101
Id.
102
Id. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877 (1997)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
103
ESA I, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.
104
See id.
105
Id. at 1076, 1081.
106
ESA II, 469 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2006).
107
Id.
99
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The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the SEVGL
was a content-based restriction and thus demanded strict scrutiny
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.108
The court held the State’s asserted interest—“shielding children
from indecent sexual material and in assisting parents in protecting
their children from that material”109—was most surely a compelling
interest.110
It then moved on to narrow tailoring and referred back to AAMA,
in which the court held that legislation shall not unduly burden the
First Amendment rights of minors.111 Moreover, it is not enough that a
statute not affect the First Amendment rights of minors.112 Rather, the
State must choose the least restrictive means available to regulate
indecent material for minors.113 Whether a statute employs the least
restrictive means possible is determined by applying either Ginsberg
or Miller.114
Because the SEVGL’s definition of “sexually explicit” did not
conform to the full three-part test from either Ginsberg or Miller, “the
State failed to narrowly tailor the statute and created a statute that is
unconstitutionally overbroad.”115 The SEVGL did not include the third

108

Id. at 646.
ESA II, 469 F.3d at 646 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Br. of
Pet’r-Appellant Governor Rod Blagojevich at 16, ESA II, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir
2006) (No. 06-1012), 2006 WL 652392).
110
ESA II, 469 F.3d at 646 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 675
(2004) (“To be sure, our cases have recognized a compelling interest in protecting
minors from exposure to sexually explicit materials”).
111
ESA II, 469 F.3d at 646 (quoting AAMA, 244 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir. 2001)
(“Children have First Amendment Rights”) (emphasis in original).
112
ESA II, 469 F.3d at 646.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 648-49 (“That is to say, somewhere between Ginsberg and Miller we
arrive at the basement for constitutionality of a statute criminalizing the distribution
of sexually oriented materials to minors”).
115
Id. at 649.
109
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prong of either Ginsberg or Miller, and also omitted the language
requiring the regulated works to be evaluated as a whole.116
And because the SEVGL did not require the State to evaluate each
video game as a whole or consider the literary, educational, or artistic
value the games may have provided, the statute needlessly
encompassed video games that have “social importance for minors.”117
The game God of War, is one example of a game that the SEVGL
would regulate because it renders images of exposed female breasts.118
But taken as whole, the game provides some social importance for
minors, and should escape regulation.119
III. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REEVALUATE
ROTH AND MILLER/GINSBERG
A. The Supreme Court should reevaluate Roth
and hold that the First Amendment protects obscenity.
The Court’s refusal to afford First Amendment protection to
obscenity is unsupported by precedent, policy, and logic. To
understand why, we must first look to Roth v. U.S., in which the
Supreme Court firmly established that obscenity is not protected
speech.120
The general thrust of Roth is two-fold: 1) obscenity does not
contribute meaningfully to society, and is thus not deserving of
protection;121 and 2) it is implicit that the First Amendment does not
protect obscenity.122

116

Id.
Id. at 649-50.
118
Id. at 650 (discussing the game God of War, which is similar in content and
theme to Homer’s Odyssey).
119
Id. at 650.
120
354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
121
See id. at 484.
122
See id. at 483.
117
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But the Court never fully establishes why and how obscene
speech does not contribute to society. And the idea that “implicit in the
history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity” is
illogical and ultimately unsupportable.123 Although the Court cited
dozens of cases to support this proposition, one need look no further
than the first case cited to determine that the support is strained, at
best.
The Court first cited to Ex Parte Jackson, a case from 1877
concerning a statute regulating use of the mails.124 In Jackson, the
Court found it was without question that the mails could not be used to
send “obscene, lewd, or lascivious” materials.125 But using this
passage to support the proposition that obscenity was never meant to
be protected by the First Amendment strains reason. Consider that in
the very same passage, the Court also held that states could prevent the
use of the mail system to send materials regarding birth control,
abortion, indecency, and lotteries.126
Because Jackson proscribed use of the mails for many purposes
now allowed, logic cannot sustain the inference that Jackson supports
an entire category of speech being exempted from First Amendment
protection. While Jackson is merely one case of many cited by the
Court in Roth, it illustrates the utter lack of logic underlying its
holding. The Court attempts to rely on precedent to support its
holding, but no clear precedent exists.127
Furthermore, while it may have once been assumed that obscenity
was not intended for First Amendment protection, this alone should
not suffice to support the excising of an entire category of speech from

123

Id.
Id. at 481 (citing Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1877)).
125
96 U.S. at 736.
126
Id.
127
See Roth, 354 U.S. at 481 (noting that Roth presented a question of first
impression).
124
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First Amendment protection.128 Many ideas and policies once accepted
have long since been rejected.129
In an attempt to address just what it is about obscenity that
distinguishes it from other objectionable forms of expression, the
Court endorsed the Model Penal Code’s definition of obscenity: “A
thing is obscene if . . . it goes substantially beyond customary limits of
candor in description or representation of [nudity, sex, or
excretion].”130 But this definition contradicts the Court’s own
reasoning with language within the same opinion. The Court took
great care in Roth to note that “unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas,
even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full
protection of the [First Amendment].”131 This explanation of the First
Amendment certainly seems to encompass that which “goes
substantially beyond customary limits of candor.”132 Yet, the Court
refuses to conform to its own logic. This internal contradiction and
inconsistency exemplifies the overarching contradictory nature of
obscenity jurisprudence.
The Roth Court also went to great lengths to avoid expressly
answering the question of why obscenity is judged on the basis of
offensiveness and not its likelihood of inciting lawless action.133 And it
did so by offering a stunningly circular argument: obscenity is judged
on the basis of offensiveness rather than any harm it may cause
because it is not protected speech, and it is not protected because it is
not judged on the harm it may cause.134 Not only is this argument

128

See id. at 484.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 1;
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
130
Roth, 354 U.S. at 488 n. 20 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2)
(Tentative Draft No. 6 1957)).
131
Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
132
Id. at 488.
133
Id. at 486-87.
134
Id. (quoting Beauharnais v. People of State of Ill., 343 U.S. 250, 266
(1952)) (“Certainly no one would contend that obscene speech, for example, may be
punished only upon a showing of [harm it causes]”)).
129
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circular, but it contradicts the Court’s own reasoning in other First
Amendment cases.135
There exists an even greater problem with the Roth decision, as
noted by Justice Douglas.136 The Court’s decision allows states to
punish for “thoughts provoked, not for overt acts nor antisocial
conduct.”137 This position allows states to regulate materials merely
for the thoughts they provoke rather than harms they cause, a position
otherwise rejected by the Supreme Court.138 The standard authorized
in Roth conflicts with the First Amendment, and “[c]ertainly that
standard would not be an acceptable one if religion, economics,
polities or philosophy were involved. How does it become a
constitutional standard when literature treating with sex is
concerned?”139
The Court has not yet answered this question and neither has the
Seventh Circuit. In light of this, it makes little sense to apply a
different standard to obscenity than to violent expression. The Court
should remedy this by answering Justice Douglas’ question or
providing First Amendment protection to obscenity.
B. States’ compelling interest in preventing harm to minors should
apply equally to violent and sexual content.
The district court and the Seventh Circuit correctly applied
Supreme Court precedent in ESA I and ESA II, respectively. The law is
clear regarding sexually explicit materials: shielding minors from

135

See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (stating “the
fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing
it”).
136
Roth, 354 U.S. at 508-14 (1957) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (“It is no answer to
say, as the Court does, that obscenity is not protected speech”).
137
Id. at 509.
138
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“[T]he Court’s
First Amendment cases draw vital distinctions between words and deeds, between
ideas and conduct”).
139
Roth, 354 U.S. at 512 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
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sexually explicit content is a compelling interest.140 The law is equally
clear regarding violent content: states may not regulate violent
expression absent a showing that the speech is directed at causing
imminent violence and is likely to do so.141
Less clear is the reason why it is compelling to protect children
from sexually explicit materials, but not violent materials. This is
especially true given the overarching compelling interest of
“protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors.”142
Judge Posner attempted to explain this distinction in AAMA in 2000,
but his explanation falls short.143
As Judge Posner explained, the concerns animating obscenity
laws and violent expressions are very different.144 Obscenity is not
denied constitutional protection because of the harm it causes, but
rather simply because it is offensive.145 Unlike with nearly all other
categories of expression, states need not demonstrate that obscenity is
likely to incite lawlessness or cause harm in order to regulate it.146
With obscenity, “[o]ffensiveness is the offense.”147
But as Judge Posner pointed out, a statute regulating violent
expression based on offensiveness could not withstand judicial
scrutiny.148 Protecting citizens from violence is a compelling interest,
but unlike obscenity law, protecting them from violent images is
not.149
Judge Posner dispensed with this seemingly arbitrary distinction
between sex and violence by asserting that protecting people from
violent images is a novel idea, while protecting people from sexually
140

See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 675 (2004).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
142
Sable Commc’n of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
143
See generally 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2000).
144
Id. at 574.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 575.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942)).
141
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explicit images is the traditional concern of obscenity laws.150 This is
true, but it does not explain why this distinction exists; it merely
explains that it does exist.
The central holding of Ginsberg is that potential psychological
harm to minors is a sufficient basis for shielding children from sexual
expression.151 The Court remarked that this finding was not “an
accepted scientific fact.”152 But the Court held that it did not require
scientific proof; it was enough for the Court that it merely not be
irrational to conclude that sexual materials may harm children.153
Judge Posner referenced this basis in AAMA when he suggested
that an ordinance regulating violent video games premised on harm to
children must meet the same standard from Ginsberg.154 If this were
true, then a mere showing of potential harm from exposing juveniles to
violent images would suffice to regulate violent content. But he then
contradicted himself and completely misstated Ginsberg by stating
that “[t]he grounds must be compelling not merely plausible.”155
This internal inconsistency from AAMA is representative of the
logic, or lack thereof, regarding whether harm to minors is a
compelling interest.
In Ginsberg, the Court found no causal link between sexually
explicit materials and harm to children, but did not require such a link
to find the statute constitutional.156 The Court even stated, “[w]e do
not demand of legislatures scientifically certain criteria of
legislation.”157 But both the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit
demand this scientific rigor when it comes to statutes regulating

150

AAMA, 244 F.3d. at 575-76.
Id. at 576.
152
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968).
153
Id.
154
AAMA, 244 F.3d at 576.
155
Id.
156
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642.
157
Id. at 642-43 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151
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violent images.158 In fact, this lack of a scientific causal connection
between violent video games and increased aggression in minors who
play such games was central to the district court striking down the
VVGL in ESA I.159
As a matter of legal consistency, the courts should apply the same
level of scrutiny to all expression aimed at minors. If it is so clearly a
compelling interest to protect the psychological and physical welfare
of minors,160 then the specific category of expression should not
matter. If the potential harm to children stemming from exposure to
sexually explicit images is enough to regulate sexual expression aimed
at juveniles, then the potential harm to children stemming from
exposure to violent images should also be enough to regulate violent
expression aimed at juveniles.
The Seventh Circuit’s response to this idea has been that concern
over sexual images has long been a concern of the people, but not so
for violent images.161 But as Justice Harlan highlighted, the fact that
obscenity is not protected speech does not answer the question why it
is not protected.162
Additionally, much of the logic Judge Posner uses to justify
exposing minors to violent images works applies equally well to
sexual images.163 Judge Posner argued quite sensibly that violence is
often a matter of politics, and young voters should be allowed access
to uncensored speech prior to becoming voting age “so that their
minds are not a blank when they first exercise the franchise.”164
“People are unlikely to become well-functioning, independent-minded
adults and responsible citizens if they are raised in an intellectual

158

See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); AAMA, 244 F.3d at

579.
159

ESA I, 404 F. Supp. 2d, 1051, 1073-74 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
Sable Commc’n of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
161
AAMA, 244 F.3d 572, 575-76 (7th Cir. 2001).
162
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 507 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
163
AAMA, 244 F.3d at 577-78.
164
Id. at 577.
160
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bubble.”165 This argument works just as well if the topic becomes
sexually explicit materials, rather than violent materials.
Judge Posner continued to argue against regulating violent images
aimed at children because violence is a significant human interest.166
This is no doubt true, but it is no less true of sex, and the Supreme
Court admitted as much even when holding that the First Amendment
does not protect obscenity.167 If humankind’s interest in violence is
equaled by its interest in sex, and violent expression is afforded
protection on the basis of human interest, then obscenity should also
be afforded that protection.
Finally, Judge Posner argued that “shield[ing] children right up to
the age of 18 from exposure to violent descriptions and images would
not only be quixotic, but deforming; it would leave them unequipped
to cope with the world as we know it.”168 Again, because sex is a
recurrent interest of humankind, this statement can apply with equal
force to sexual expression. Young adults face great exposure to sexual
content, and to shield minors from access to this material is no less
quixotic.
Ultimately, the district court and the Seventh Circuit correctly
struck down both the VVGL and SEVGL, but the SEVGL was given a
free pass on the compelling interest prong of strict scrutiny whereas
the VVGL was found not to encompass a compelling interest. This
disparity is troubling from a policy and parental perspective, but also
inconsistent legally.
The logical conclusion is not necessarily that sexual expression
should be afforded the same high level of scrutiny as violent
expression in the context of minors, but rather that the interest in
protecting minors from violent expression should equal that of sexual
expression.
165

Id.
Id.
167
Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 (“Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human
life, has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the
ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern”).
168
AAMA, 244 F.3d at 577.
166
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CONCLUSION
Nearly all forms of expression demand full First Amendment
protection, yet obscenity continues to fall outside the cover of this
protective shield.
Currently, states may regulate obscenity merely for thoughts
provoked and not for harms it may cause. But as the Court has noted,
“First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the government
seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible
end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must
be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of
thought.”169
In order to uphold the virtues and purpose of the First
Amendment, the Court should change course and afford obscenity the
full protection of the First Amendment, just as it does other categories
of objectionable and offensive speech.
This is not the only change the Court should make in First
Amendment law. The Court justifiably holds that protecting children
from sexually indecent materials is a compelling interest strong
enough to withstand strict scrutiny because of potential psychological
harm such materials may cause children.170 And it allows regulations
on this basis absent a causal link between the sexually explicit
materials and such harm.
But courts are not able to apply this same standard to violent
materials aimed at minors. Instead, when it comes to violent materials,
legislatures must demonstrate a causal link between the violent content
and imminent violent conduct.171
This disparity between sexual and violent content makes little
sense in light of the compelling interest of protecting the psychological
welfare of minors.172 So if sexual materials directed to minors may be
169

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002).
See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 675 (2004).
171
ESA I, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1073 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
172
Sable Comm’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
170
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regulated so as to prevent mere potential harm, then so too should
violent materials.
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